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This article compares how the strategy of the Trades Union Congress’ (TUC) 
attempts to influence the Multi-Fibre Arrangement and implement a ‘social clause’ 
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) changed between the 
Tokyo and the Uruguay rounds of negotiations. Based on internal TUC documents, 
this article specifically focuses on the UK textile industry. The article critiques and 
historicizes the TUC’s strategies to influence GATT negotiations in a period of 
enormous economic and political change. In addition to the limitations of the TUC’s 
own strategies, the economic shift from broadly embedded liberal to neo-liberal 
economic hegemony is cited as a crucial factor in the TUC’s declining influence. By 
studying the TUC’s strategies and alliances at the national, European, and 
transnational level, it is revealed that it was unprepared and slow to react to this 
structural shift and clung to idealized notions of the historic post-war ‘consensus’ 
that were fast becoming obsolete.   
                                                          
1 This article is largely based on the findings of a research stay at the TUC Archives at the Modern Records 
Centre, University of Warwick which was generously funded by a research bursary from the Society for the 
Study of Labour History 
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The call for maintaining ‘fair’ labour standards in relation to trade liberalization - referred to 
most commonly as a ‘social clause’ - has existed in its modern form since the first World 
Trade Conference in Havana, 1948. Often the issue of labour standards has been raised as a 
more or less obvious cover for the defence of certain industries in developed economies from 
those of the developing world. Couched in the language of solidarity and human rights, this 
attitude has undoubtedly pervaded certain elements of the labour movement, particularly in 
industries such as textiles where developing economies have an absolute advantage in terms 
of labour costs.  
The role of the TUC during the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of the GATT – the last of 
eight multilateral trade rounds under the auspices of the GATT before it was replaced by the 
World Trade Organization in 1995 –  is a key example of how the issue of a social clause was 
conflated with the desire to protect the UK’s textile industry. By predicating its support for 
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and a GATT social clause on the continuation of 
embedded liberal economics, the TUC was able to synchronize its interests with important 
actors at certain stages, not least the UK government and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) to gain a certain level of influence. However, the limits of this approach 
would become all too clear as the Tokyo Round (1973 to 1979) came to a close and a 
completely new economic and political environment emerged by the start of the Uruguay 
Round (1986 to 1994). Embedded liberalism and the post-war ‘consensus’ were rapidly 
usurped by the rise of neo-liberalism and an era-defining battle between capital and labour, a 
battle which labour undoubtedly lost.  
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In a very short period of time, the social, economic and political environment that had 
served the TUC so well was replaced by an entirely new and hostile one. Importantly, the 
TUC’s main avenue of influence (based on its relationship with the UK Labour Party) would 
be out of power for another 18 years, forcing the confederation to seek new avenues. 
However, the strength that the TUC had derived from its role in the UK’s post-war 
corporatist power structure - defined throughout this article as a system of political exchange 
and accommodation between labour, capital, and the state 2 as an attempt to contain class 
conflict through the social control of union leaderships - 3 would soon become its biggest 
weakness as the leadership’s conservatism, path dependency, and lack of a class analysis of 
the unfolding situation limited its ability to react to events.  
Drawing on internal documents from the TUC archives, this article takes a temporal 
perspective to compare how the strategy of the TUC changed from the Tokyo to the Uruguay 
Rounds of GATT negotiations, with specific reference to the textile industry and the MFA. It 
will argue that the TUC’s support of the MFA was based largely on economic arguments 
linked to the defence of domestic industries. In contrast, when raised at all, the social clause 
was often framed in a disjointed fashion and only after the TUC’s economic arguments had 
failed to influence decision-makers. The TUC was therefore caught between self-interest and 
solidarity and is representative of the dilemma trade unions have often faced when attempting 
to influence the direction of world trade. Furthermore, it will be argued that the TUC’s 
strategy was predicated on the maintenance of its belief in the historic post-war compromise 
between capital and labour and was entirely unprepared for its demise.  
                                                          
2 Martin Upchurch, Graham Taylor and Andy Mathers, The Crisis of Social Democratic Trade Unionism in 
Western Europe: The Search for Alternatives. (Farnham, 2009), 10. 
3 Leo Panitch, ‘The Limits of Corporatism’, New Left Review, 31, (1981), 21-43. 
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The rise and fall of embedded liberalism and the post-war compromise 
The paradigm of embedded/disembedded economics, initially established by Polanyi, 
historicized the extent to which market economies were either constricted by or linked to 
non-economic or social institutions. 4 The post-war economic order, of which the GATT 
formed its international trade regime, has often been described as one of ‘embedded 
liberalism’. 5 Such an economic system, summed up by the phrase ‘Smith abroad, Keynes at 
home’, attempted to find a balance between multilateral free trade at the international level 
combined with the right of states to protect economic sectors that were crucial to national 
employment. 6 Internationally, embedded liberalism was perhaps best exemplified by the 
Bretton Woods system, designed as it was to regulate exchange rates and guard against 
speculation. Within the GATT framework, free trade largely concerned the lowering of tariff 
barriers to stimulate the world economy which it did with unprecedented success. 7  
The interaction of the historic compromise between labour and capital that was 
brokered in this period (most notably in the UK and West Germany) and the so-called 
‘Golden Age of Capitalism’ – consisting of unparalleled economic growth, economic stability 
                                                          
4 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, (Boston, 1944). 
5 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar 
economic order’, International Organization, 36.2 (1982), 379-415. 
6 Andreas Bieler, Bruno Ciccaglione and John Hilary, ‘Transnational solidarity, labour  
movements and the problem of international free trade’, (paper  presented on the panel  “Structures and 
Strategies in the Emerging Global Labor  Movement” at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology, 
Gothenburg, Sweden, 11–17  July 2010)  
7 Andreas Bieler, John Hilary and Ingemar Lindberg, ‘Trade Unions, “Free Trade” and the Problem of 
Transnational Solidarity: An Introduction’, Globalizations, 11.1 (2014), 1-9. DOI: 
10.1080/14747731.2014.860319  
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and employment levels – 8 put European labour movements in a particularly strong position 
in the post-war era for a number of reasons. Firstly, there was the undeniable importance of a 
productive and compliant labour force in post-war reconstruction which allowed trade unions 
to develop and reinforce its own strength relatively unhindered by employers’ inherent fear of 
such strength. Secondly, the achievements of huge economic growth and full or near-full 
employment not only offered labour a structural advantage over capital for a period but also 
allowed capital room to offer concessions to workers’ organizations whilst still maintaining 
profits. Thirdly, and more generally, Europe’s post-war configuration - such as the relative 
weakness of ruling classes following the war, higher expectations among workers after 
winning the war against fascism, the prevalence of powerful workers’ parties (both reformist 
and revolutionary) in many West European countries, and half the continent coming under 
communist rule - saw the continent take a distinct shift to the left, albeit in forms specific to 
each country. These factors contributed to the prominent role of labour in many West 
European societies and the strengthening of the ‘party-union nexus’ on the basis of a 
corporatist relationship between capital, labour and the state. 9 
In this environment, trade unions such as the TUC enjoyed a very close relationship 
with the workers’ parties that they both funded and influenced. The strength of this link 
between the UK trade union movement and the UK Labour Party in this period was reflected 
not just in its constitution (which had not significantly changed since trade unions formed the 
party in 1906) but also in the number of Labour MPs who were sponsored by trade unions 
                                                          
8 Andrew Glyn, Alan Hughes, Alain Lipietz and Ajit Singh, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age’, in Stephen 
Alan Marglin and Juliet B Schor (eds), The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience 
(Oxford, 1990), 39-125.  
9 M Upchurch et al, The Crisis (Farnham, 2009). 
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(almost 50 per cent in 1979, for example). 10 Naturally, the TUC leadership played a central 
role in this formulation and enjoyed an extremely close relationship with the upper echelons 
of the party, holding regular meetings on many aspects of union and party policy. 
This is not to say that class conflict was completely overcome in Western Europe in 
this period as the near-revolution in France 1968 and the ‘Hot Autumn’ in Italy 1969-70 
showed. In fact, rather than completely substituting the power of rank-and-file trade unionism 
for institutionalized corporatist economic management, in the UK the power of the shop 
stewards movement actually grew, highlighting the increasing tension between the militancy 
of the shop floor and the conservatism of their leaders. 11 In contrast to the strong ‘discipline’ 
and highly institutionalized corporatist structures of Modell Deutschland, for example, UK 
governments found it harder to sustain the wage restraints that formed the trade unions’ 
contribution to the post-war compromise. 12 This set the scene for a confrontation between 
the rank-and-file of the UK labour movement and the leadership of its own organizations 
(most dramatically exemplified in the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978-79).  
The growing differences between union members and their leaders represented the 
beginnings of processes that were hostile to union power as well as the post-war compromise 
and would ultimately inflict huge damage on the strength of the labour movement 
domestically and internationally. It is no coincidence that some labour scholars have marked 
1975 as the point that signified the beginning of trade union decline, in stark contrast to the 
early post-war period which saw a growing membership and an institutionalized role in 
                                                          
10 A Thorpe, ‘The Labour Party and the trade unions’, in John McIlroy, Nina Fishman, and Alan Campbell, 
British trade unions and industrial politics, vol.2: The high tide of trade unionism, 1964-1979 (Aldershot, 
1999), 133-50. 
11  Upchurch et al, The Crisis, 91 
12 Stephen Bornstein, ‘States and Unions; From Postwar Settlement to Contemporary Stalemate’, in Stephen 
Bornstein, Joel Krieger and David Held (eds) The State in capitalist Europe: a casebook (London, 1984). 
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industrial relations and politics. 13 Ultimately, three inter-related structural factors were to 
severely challenge the dominance of embedded liberalism which significantly impacted the 
ability of trade unions to maintain their influence: emergent processes of globalization; global 
economic restructuring; and the rise of neo-liberalism as a hegemonic ideology. Each of these 
processes attacked the traditional bases of union power: ‘institutionalized interest 
representation’ within the nation state; the structural economic position and power of the 
industrial working class; and the existence of a broadly organized and diffused working class 
social and political culture based on traditional trade union notions of solidarity, socialism 
and class consciousness.  
The above processes were not restricted to the national level, of course. Whilst the 
Bretton Woods institutions may have come to represent the international dimension of 
embedded liberalism in the early post-war era, they undoubtedly constituted the liberal aspect 
of this compromise. So, whilst GATT rules allowed the freedom (at this stage) for nation 
states to limit any damage that trade liberalization may cause, the national and international 
spheres were deliberately separated, leaving the embedded aspect of the compromise entirely 
at the behest of national governments. 14 The continuation of embedded liberalism therefore 
rested on the maintenance of the post-war economic boom to act as a buffer between the two 
competing interests of international trade liberalization (capital) and state intervention in the 
economy (labour). Once economic changes such as the 1973 oil crisis reduced the ‘space’ in 
which these two sets of interests could find a compromise, the system began to disintegrate. 
                                                          
13 Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser, ‘When institutions matter: union growth and decline in Western 
Europe, 1950-95’, European Sociological Review (1999), 135-58 
14 Jens Steffek, Embedded Liberalism and Its Critics: Justifying Global Governance in the American Century 
(Basingstoke, 2006), 52-5. 
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In this situation, trade unions’ willingness (or lack thereof) to adopt new methods based on 
their collective strength would play a decisive role in the direction of the world economy. 
Whilst it may be tempting to reduce trade union decline to structural factors that were 
beyond the control and power of trade unions, this deterministic approach ignores a vital 
subjective factor; the agency of trade union leaderships. By definition, trade unions are 
consistently caught - to borrow Hyman’s model - in an ‘eternal triangle... [between] market, 
class and society’ 15 and face on a daily basis the dilemma of whether to pursue ‘the logic of 
influence’ or the ‘logic of membership’. 16 The corporatist model that the TUC endorsed in 
the post-war period undoubtedly held similar trappings despite some of the benefits that 
workers’ clearly felt as a result of such a long period of consensus - the roots of such a 
consensus, however, undoubtedly lay in the power of organized labour in this period. From a 
class perspective, the limitations of corporatism lie in the fact that collective bargaining is 
shifted from the industrial sphere (the purest expression of union power) to the political 
sphere. 17 In this sense, corporatism ‘smoothes out’ the divisions between the separate class 
interests of workers, capital and the state and instead seeks ‘mutual’ accommodation. As 
such, trade union leaders face the danger of moving from their real position as representatives 
of specific class interests to collaborating with interests that undermine those of workers. 18 
                                                          
15 Richard Hyman, Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, Class and Society. (London, 
2001). 
16 Jon-Erik Dølvik, Redrawing the Boundaries of Solidarity? ETUC, Social Dialogue and the Europeanisation 
of Trade Unions in the 1990’s (Oslo, 1997). 
17 A. Pizzorno, ‘Political exchange and collective identity in industrial conflict’, in Colin Crouch and Alessandro 
Pizzorno (eds), The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968, Volume 2 (London, 1978). 
18 Erik Olin Wright, ‘Working Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests and Class Compromise’, American 
Journal of Sociology, 105 (4), (2000) 957-1002.  
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Whilst it was clearly possible to contain these inherent contradictions during the post-
war boom, the changing economic fortunes and ideological perspectives of British and world 
capitalism in the 1970s meant that the corporatist model would become more and more 
compromised leaving trade unions at a crossroads: they could either change their strategy to 
oppose this new offensive, or try and resuscitate the model. In the TUC’s case, and in 
contrast to the wave of militancy occurring at the shop-floor level, it chose the latter. At best, 
this decision reflected a generalised conservatism that is endemic in large scale trade union 
bureaucracies; 19at worst, it signified an acceptance of class compromise over the real class 
interests of trade union members. These choices would play a decisive role in the increasing 
inability of the TUC and others to influence the direction of world trade towards the interests 
of labour rather than capital.  
 
 
The TUC and the MFA during the GATT Tokyo Round 
Whilst the Kennedy Round of the GATT (1963-1967) has been argued to represent the height 
of post-war international co-operation and trade liberalization, 20 by the advent of the next 
round of GATT negotiations, dark clouds had been hanging over the world economy for 
some time as economic growth began to slow for the first time since the end of the war. The 
Tokyo Round (1973-1979) would coincide with multiple economic crises – a renewed 
monetary crisis, worldwide inflation, supply cutbacks, price increases (especially in 
                                                          
19 Richard Hyman, ‘Shifting Dynamics in International Trade Unionism: Agitation, Organisation, Bureaucracy, 
Diplomacy’, Labor History, 46 (2), (2005) 137-154.  
20 Lucia Coppolaro, The Making of a World Trading Power: The European Economic Community (EEC) in the 
GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963-67) (Farnham, 2013), 2. 
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petroleum), and ‘unprecedented shortages of food and other primary products previously in 
chronic surplus’ 21 - that would ultimately provide the economic basis for the end of 
embedded liberal hegemony.  
Whilst the very worst effects of the above processes arguably did not become fully 
apparent until well into the 1980s, there is evidence to suggest that an economic departure 
from embedded liberalism was beginning to take place by the start of the Tokyo Round itself. 
This is especially true of the textile industry, a sector that is acutely vulnerable to economic 
fluctuations and therefore protectionism. A large aspect of this trend, due to its labour-
intensive nature, is the absolute advantage of developing countries with low labour costs over 
developed countries. The TUC was keenly aware of the precarious state that the UK textile 
industry was in even before the world economic crisis that was still to come. At the 1972 
TUC Congress, a motion was moved – and unanimously carried – which noted with alarm the 
rise in imports in the textile industry which was linked as a contributory factor to increasing 
unemployment. 22 These fears were undoubtedly well founded and mirrored the thoughts of 
other developed economies, such as the US, in this period. 23 Of central concern was the 
decline in employment in the UK’s textile, clothing and footwear industries which fell by 30 
per cent between 1959 and 1975. 24 
The monumental structural changes that were beginning to occur in the textile 
industry specifically and the world economy generally were approached in similar ways by 
                                                          
21 GATT Secretariat, GATT Activities in 1973 (Geneva, 1973), 11. 
22 Trades Union Congress (hereafter TUC), Report of Annual Congress, 1972 (London: 1972).  
23 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereafter GATT) Cotton Textiles Committee, Statement by the 
Representative of the United States at the Meeting of 8 October 1969. COT/W/118, 9 October 1969, accessed 16 
October 2015, http://sul-derivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=90660234&mediaType=application/pdf 
24 Modern Records Centre (hereafter MRC), Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/4, TUC Textile, Clothing 
and Footwear Industries Committee (hereafter TUC-TCFC) Report: Trade Policy, 15 May 1975.  
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the TUC. Generally speaking, the TUC clung to the ideas of embedded liberalism that had 
served it so well since the end of the war, even whilst processes of globalization were striding 
ahead. One such example of this is the TUC’s support for implementing the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) and a ‘social clause’ – International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Conventions on Labour Standards which cover freedom of association and collective 
bargaining; child labour; forced labour; and equality 25 - into GATT trade agreements. Both 
of these examples highlight the balance that trade unions were trying to find between 
supporting free trade internationally and government intervention domestically to offset its 
negative aspects.   
The MFA is an interesting case for many reasons, not least because it represented a 
huge departure from traditional GATT rules and norms. Essentially, the MFA (which was 
first enacted on 1 January 1974) ‘provided for the application of selective quantitative 
restrictions when surges in imports of particular products caused, or threatened to cause, 
serious damage to the industry of the importing country’. 26 It therefore seriously undermined 
all talk of non-discrimination in trade that had been central to the foundation of the GATT. 
Ultimately, this was a measure to shield developed countries from unfettered competition 
from developing nations who could produce textile products at a far lower cost. 27 
Over the coming decades, the TUC and others who saw the MFA’s potential to offer 
some form of protection to the huge decline in the domestic textile industry, would face a 
constant battle to renew the MFA in the face of the increasing liberalization of world trade. 
                                                          
25 Gerda Van Roozendaal, Trade Unions and Global Governance: The Debate on a Social Clause, (London, 
2002), 2. 
26 World Trade Organization, ‘Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB): The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing’ 
(2015). Accessed 16 October 2015 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm. 
27 Ying-Pik Choi, Hwa Soo Chung and Nicolas Marian, The Multi-Fibre Arrangement in Theory and Practice 
(London, 1985), 11.  
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The TUC’s Textile and Clothing Committee (TUC-TCC) (later to become the Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Committee (TUC-TCFC)) not only supported the introduction of the 
MFA but also lobbied UK government representatives to make the GATT definition of 
market disruption more explicit and widen the coverage of the arrangement. 28 Perhaps 
indicative of the TUC-TCFC’s focus on economic issues in this period, a 1976 document 
concerning the renegotiation of the MFA makes very little mention of the importance of 
improving conditions for workers in developing countries. 29 This suggests that the TUC saw 
its interests being better served through lobbying governments whose textile policy broadly 
overlapped with their own.  
The main avenue of influence that the TUC pursued throughout the Tokyo Round 
naturally centred on their close relationship with the Labour government. Memoranda and 
communications were regularly exchanged between the TUC-TCFC and the Secretaries of 
State for Trade and Industry during the Tokyo Round (which almost entirely coincided with a 
Labour government). In fact, the TUC-TCFC even received verbal reports from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on negotiations that the TUC were not entitled to be 
present at. 30 In other instances, the DTI also worked closely with the TUC to ensure they 
were aware of and present at all relevant GATT meetings. 31 However, signs of fractures 
between the Department of Trade and Industry and the TUC-TCFC (though minimal 
compared to what was to come under the Conservative government) did also exist at this 
                                                          
28 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/522/1A, TUC Textile and Clothing Industries Committee 
(hereafter TUC-TCC), Textile Negotiations at the GATT, 7 March 1974. 
29 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/522/1A, TUC –TCC Renegotiation of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement, 13 September 1976 
30 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, TUC Inter-departmental correspondence re: Textiles: GATT Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, 6 April 1979 
31 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/522/1A, TUC Inter-departmental correspondence re: TUC 
representation at GATT textiles meeting, 10 October 1973. 
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stage. Whilst there was a broad level of agreement and overlap in policy on the way forward 
for the textiles industry, the TUC clashed with the government when it revealed that it was 
only prepared to offer £10 million in direct industry aid to certain sectors of the industry. 32 In 
contrast, the TUC had hoped for £40 million which would be spread throughout the whole 
industry.  
Regular meetings between the TUC-TCFC and new Secretary of State for Trade, John 
Smith, also took place in 1978 and 1979 (prior to Labour’s electoral defeat) at the height of 
the Tokyo Round negotiations. The minutes of these meetings show a complete focus on the 
economic aspects of the MFA (which was due to be renewed) with no mention of the social 
clause. This is not to say, however, that the issue of the social clause was completely ignored 
by the TUC at the national level. In a textile conference speech from 1975, for example, the 
Chairman of the TUC-TCFC reiterated the importance of the social clause in relation to the 
MFA for protecting the rights and standards of living for textile workers in developed and 
developing countries. 33 These sentiments were also linked to the need for a massive shift in 
resources towards exports and investment as opposed to merely focusing on import 
restrictions. This perspective was an important development in the TUC’s outlook as it 
became increasingly clear that, although the labour standards in developing economies were 
worthy of being described as ‘developing’, the manufacturing industries and production 
techniques of these same economies were in fact highly developed. 34  
                                                          
32 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/4, TUC-TCFC Report: Trade Policy, 15 May 1975. 
33 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/4, TUC-TCFC Speech Notes for Harrogate Conference April 
8-9 1975. The Future of the Textile Industry: A Union View, 1975 
34 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/6, TUC-TCFC Report: Renegotiation of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement, 6 January 1977 
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Overall, throughout the Tokyo Round there understandably appears to be a broad 
level of agreement between the TUC-TCFC and the Labour government, with any differences 
stemming from issues of emphasis rather than overall policy. The closeness of the party-
union nexus at the top of both organizations - backed up by high union density and a 
powerful shop stewards movement - was therefore highly productive for the TUC in diffusing 
its policy choices at the national level. However, it is difficult to trace the overall success of 
the TUC’s influence over GATT textile policy since their position was broadly similar to 
many national European governments and therefore the EEC in general. This policy overlap 
explains to a large degree why the issue of the social clause was rarely raised as anything 
other than a related issue to the MFA as opposed to being a central component. Nonetheless, 
the TUC was prepared to use the social clause as a framing device in its more public 
pronouncements. 
The extent to which the TUC looked to the European level as a method of influence 
during the Tokyo Round is closely linked to its ambiguous position on the question of 
European integration. Though the UK labour movement is often posed merely as an opponent 
of European integration in this period, Teague suggests that a greater complexity of views 
existed within the TUC and argues that there were distinct ‘pro’, ‘anti’ and ‘pragmatic’ 
camps on this issue. 35 In the 1970s, these camps would rise from beneath the surface of TUC 
discussions to reveal the disunity within the movement as Britain’s membership of the EEC 
was put to a referendum in 1975. Eventually adopting a position of opposition to the EEC 
(which it officially held until the so-called ‘Delors Conference’ of 1988), 36 the TUC 
                                                          
35 Paul Teague, The British TUC and the European Community, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 
18.1 (1989), 29-45. DOI:10.1177/03058298890180010401 
36  Richard Hyman, ‘Trade Unions and the Ambiguities of Social Europe’, Paper to the IIRA World Congress 
Berlin, September 2003, 
http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/page.jsp?paperid=6688826&searchTerm=european+public+policy 
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nonetheless attempted to influence the European level and worked to strengthen the European 
trade union movement. 37    
In relation to the GATT and the MFA, the TUC understood the benefit of attempting 
to influence the EEC institutions, and the Commission in particular, due to the EEC bloc that 
operated within both. At this stage, it is fair to say that the TUC operated at the European 
level to protect its gains at home rather than out of a genuine sense of ‘Europeanism’. In fact, 
the TUC found this new relationship to be far more beneficial than first imagined as their 
interests broadly overlapped with many EEC members due to the prevalence of social 
democratic parties and governments in this period. In 1977, for example, the TUC was able to 
overcome a number of issues in six ‘problem areas’ (predominantly concerned with quota 
levels and the coverage of the MFA) that it suggested the new MFA would pose. 38 These six 
points were then presented as a unified European trade union position to the European 
Commission. As a result of the TUC’s close relationship with Labour Trade and Industry 
ministers and this broader European strategy, the majority of these issues (with the notable 
exception of the social clause) were overcome and the government and the TUC, with a few 
minor reservations, were happy to endorse the new MFA. 39 
Another interesting facet of the TUC’s European-level influence during the Tokyo 
Round is their burgeoning relationship with the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC). The early days of this relationship saw the odd situation of the anti-EEC TUC 
holding a leading position in the ETUC (who even appointed the outspoken opponent of 
European integration, Victor Feather, as president in 1973) as the dominant force within this 
                                                          
37 Ben Rosamund, National Labour Organizations and European Integration: British Trade Unions and ‘1992’. 
Political Studies, 41.3 (1993), 420-434. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1993.tb01647.x 
38 TUC Report of Annual Congress, 1977, (London, 1977), 298. 
39 Report of Annual Congress, 1978, (London, 1978), 362-363. 
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new formulation, its membership being nearly equal to the rest of the ETUC’s affiliates 
combined. The ETUC, according to the TUC, also lacked ‘the capacity to influence their 
affiliates’ policies or mobilize industrial force, and served mainly as a lobby organization vis-
a-vis Community institutions’. 40 Nonetheless, the TUC was prepared to utilize the ETUC as 
a lobbying organization with some success during the Tokyo Round, particularly as the TUC 
itself constituted such a powerful element. This is reflected in a number of policy positions 
released by the European Trade Union Committee - Textiles, Clothing and Leather (ETUC-
TCL) in this period which almost entirely mirrored the TUC’s positions. 41 42  
The benefits of engaging in joint work with the ETUC-TCL on MFA negotiations can 
be measured by the ability of the EEC-level organization to set up meetings with Commission 
Vice President Wilhelm Haferkamp, the Commissioner responsible for External Affairs at the 
time of the first renewal of the MFA. Perhaps indicative of the prevailing social democratic 
political culture in Western Europe at this time, Commissioner Haferkamp was an ex-leader 
of the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) and a 
Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) politician from a 
working class family in the heartland of the German labour movement, the Ruhr area. He 
therefore seemed to represent a natural and powerful ally of the trade union movement at the 
European level. However, one meeting in 1978 indicated that Haferkamp’s background and 
credentials offered no guarantees of a beneficial relationship when the Commissioner 
revealed that the EEC intended to ‘give up some of its traditional industries and that there had 
                                                          
40 Jon Erik Dølvik, An Emerging Island? ETUC, Social Dialogue and the Europeanisation of the Trade Unions 
in the 1990s (Brussels, 1999), 14. 
41 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/6, European Trade Union Committee - Textile, Clothing and 
Leather (hereafter ETUC-TCL) Report: Trade Union Position on the Renewal of the Multifibre Agreement, 
1977.  
42 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/6, ETUC-TCL Report: Declaration concerning bilateral 
negotiations within the “Multifibre” Arrangement, 1977. 
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to be a programme of restructuring and development of other industries’. 43 Even more 
surprisingly, he then declared that ‘The world situation was a process that could not be 
stopped’. 44  
Although the MFA was eventually renewed as planned, the trade union 
representatives were incensed by the Commissioner’s attitude and outlook, which essentially 
put the liberalization of trade ahead of the jobs of workers in European textile industries. 
Similar attitudes also extended to the issue of the social clause where the Commissioner also 
argued that the social clause should not be seen as a ‘panacea for the industry’s problems’ 
and encouraged the unions present to use such bodies as the ILO to raise living standards in 
producer countries. 45 The limit of this argument was pointed out by the trade unions who 
correctly argued that ILO Conventions were meaningless without the presence of an 
organized labour movement in these countries.  
Whilst the social clause issue was not fought for with a great deal of conviction from 
the TUC and other European unions at the EEC-level during the Tokyo Round (arguably 
because of the success of their economic arguments), there does seem to be a very clear 
notion of the purpose and design of the social clause with very little deviation across the 
movement. An explanation of this lies in the fact that the ETUC affiliates overlapped with the 
Western members of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (now the 
International Trade Union Confederation), thus sharing a similar ideological basis, broadly 
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speaking. 46 The TUC also found a certain level of influence through the ICFTU during the 
earliest days of the MFA as in combination with a domestic strategy, the TUC took a great 
deal of influence from the international confederation in defining the social clause (although 
notably the ICFTU chose not to link the social clause with the MFA). In particular, the 
ICFTU put forward two key arguments: firstly, they advocated trade liberalization but with 
the goal of social progress and full employment in both developed and developing 
economies; 47 and secondly, they called for a tripartite GATT committee that would include 
trade union representatives to oversee the application of the ILO’s core labour standards. 48  
Although TUC influence during the Tokyo Round appears to come from a position of 
strength on a number of fronts, the nature of this influence would contribute to some severe 
problems in the near future. As mentioned previously, a significant aspect of the TUC’s 
influence relied on the maintenance of three factors: continued economic growth; the historic 
compromise between labour and capital; and a leading role in the national corporatist 
framework combined with close ties with the governing Labour Party. All three of these 
factors were quickly unravelling by the end of the Tokyo Round. The reliance on these 
strategies to influence trade policy would ultimately lead the TUC down a blind alley. Where 
the TUC and others may have been able – due to the prevalence of social democratic 
politicians and governments across Western Europe - to synchronise union interests with such 
elite-level actors in the 1970s, this strategy was entirely compromised by the rise of neo-
liberalism and the subsequent attacks on the role of labour in society. Despite this, the TUC 
showed little sign of addressing its own path dependency and instead of utilising its most 
                                                          
46 Barbara Barnouin, The European Labour Movement and European Integration, (London, 1986). 
47 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/522/1A, TUC Report: The Necessity for a Social Clause in 
GATT, 1977.  
48 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/522/1A, ICFTU Report: GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
1977 
19 
 
potent power resource – the class agency of its members – it continued to search for elite-
level influence. These choices would play a pivotal role in reducing the TUC’s influence over 
future trade negotiations and economic policy more generally. 
 
The TUC and the MFA during the GATT Uruguay Round 
By the time the Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986-1994) began, the TUC was facing an 
entirely different social, economic and political situation to the one it had faced during the 
Tokyo Round. Instead of a Labour government committed to the corporatist organization of 
society (with unions playing a leading role), the TUC now had to deal with a Conservative 
government committed to monetarist economic policy and the dismantling of the power of 
the labour movement as a whole. These changes were emblematic of a wider shift towards 
global economic restructuring through neo-liberal economic policies. Whilst elements of 
embedded liberalism still existed, neo-liberalism was well on its way to becoming the 
hegemonic economic ideology of its time.  
As a result of these broad changes, a fundamental shift in the TUC’s strategies to 
influence GATT textile policy at the national level also occurred. It was still possible for the 
TUC to meet with Conservative Trade and Industry ministers but the divergence of opinion 
compared to previous Labour governments is clear to see. Even where there was agreement 
between the two parties – that the main problem facing the UK textile industry was a lack of 
demand in the economy – the solutions offered differ significantly. For example, the TUC 
would call for government aid for the industry similar to what Belgian and French 
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governments were engaged in at the time whilst the government would oppose such schemes 
but offer no alternative solution. 49  
There were occasions however, when the Department of Industry was prepared to call 
a meeting with the TUC-TCFC rather than the other way round. 50 However, this appears to 
have been a somewhat cynical attempt by the government to gauge whether or not the TUC 
would endorse the UK’s position on the upcoming renewal of the MFA which was due to be 
discussed at the next (1982) European Council meeting. 51 From what information they had 
received, they expressed deep misgivings about what they considered the weakness of the 
negotiation mandate itself (based on issues such as global ceilings, growth rates and base 
levels, and the anti-surge mechanism). This information suggests two things: firstly, that the 
TUC was still considered an important societal actor even if its policies differed significantly 
with those of the government; and secondly, that greater liberalization of trade in textiles was 
taking place even prior to the Uruguay Round proper. This is backed up by a later study 
released by the GATT Textiles Committee that recommended ending or at the very least 
breaking up the bulk of MFA provisions. 52 The report even went as far as to suggest that the 
textile industry could no longer be considered a ‘special case’, essentially arguing that it had 
to face direct competition from developing economies without economic assistance. This is 
another clear example of the embedded liberal compromise coming to an end.  
                                                          
49 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/12, TUC-TCFC Report: Meeting with Government Ministers, 
29 July 1982 
50 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/12, TUC-TCFC Report: Meeting with Department of Industry 
Officials on the MFA, 9 December 1982. 
51 Ibid. 
52 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/522/2, TUC-TCFC Report: The GATT Study of Textile and 
Clothing Trade, 13 July 1984. 
21 
 
In light of avenues of influence at the national level all but disappearing and an 
increasingly unfavourable political climate, the TUC began turning to a more active 
opposition to the decline of the UK textile industry and support for renewing the MFA in 
1986 with terms more in sync with its own position. A 1985 TUC-TCFC report details the 
Committee’s lobbying strategy for a year leading up to the MFA renewal date. 53 This 
strategy involved lobbying local councillors, national MPs, European MEPs, and the 
European Council of Ministers and Commission (in cooperation with the ETUC-TCL, though 
the Committee also criticises their abilities as a lobbying organization). Interestingly, the 
TUC’s strategy is strongly influenced by the German Textile and Clothing Union 
(Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung - GTB), revealing the necessity and benefits of the TUC 
expanding its activities on a European and transnational basis. Notably, however, the TUC’s 
1980s congress reports make no mention of any strike action taking place in the sector and 
reveals that members were only actively mobilised twice in this period; in a demonstration 
and lobby of Parliament in 1981, 54 and an ETUC-TCL-instigated lobby of the European 
Commission in 1986 involving around 1,000 activists. 55  
Despite the expansion of its strategy, there is little evidence of the TUC employing 
the issue of the social clause at the national level around the time of the Uruguay Round. To a 
large extent this is because the government had very little understanding of its benefits and 
even less interest in supporting it. As a result, and in the absence of a more radical 
perspective, the TUC was forced to change its strategy to the European level. This would 
become a consistent theme throughout the Uruguay Round as the national level increasingly 
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provided a very limited platform on which the TUC could seek to influence the direction of 
the MFA and the textile industry in general.  
At the European level, the TUC’s strategy during the Uruguay Round was again 
shaped by its position on European integration. In part due to the experiences of the 
unrelenting Thatcherite onslaught against the UK labour movement, the TUC, after a period 
of firm opposition to Community membership in the early 1980s, began - or was forced - to 
view the European level as a potential new arena in which to argue for policies along the 
lines of those had it proposed during the Tokyo Round. As ever, there were contradictions to 
this shift. There is a great irony in the fact that the moment that represented the TUC’s 
greatest volte face regarding European integration came in the form of the Single European 
Act (SEA), arguably one of the most openly neo-liberal treaty reforms ever to have emerged 
from the European Commission. 56  
Combined with this ambitious neo-liberal programme however, came calls to 
compensate the negative effects of such policies which gave rise to a number of proposals for 
standards in social policy, employee rights and an institutionalized ‘social dialogue’. 57 In 
many respects, this must have resurrected notions of the recent embedded liberal past, albeit 
in a watered-down form and in a far less favourable social, economic and political situation. 
In reality, by choosing to avoid instigating more radical policies, the TUC’s endorsement of 
the SEA should more realistically be viewed as an acceptance of its reduced economic and 
political role as well as an understanding of the increasingly limited role that national 
institutions offered as a result of globalization and the ideological shift to the right. 58 
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Despite this new-found attitude to the European level, the TUC still held a great deal 
of concern that the EEC intended to liberalize the MFA into an unpalatable form. In 
particular, the EEC’s liberal mandate increased fears that the textile industry would be used 
as a bargaining chip in exchange for the opening up of markets and services in developing 
economies. 59 These fears were based on the TUC’s perspective that priority was 
overwhelmingly given by the EEC to the European agriculture, coal and steel industries at the 
expense of more volatile sectors such as textiles. Furthermore, the SEA not only allowed for 
an enhanced trade liberalization agenda but had the potential to negatively affect the UK 
textile industry through the abolition of national quotas on imports, a key aspect of the TUC’s 
support for the MFA. 60 
In response to these concerns, the ETUC-TCL stepped up its lobbying at Community 
level and regularly met with representatives of the European Parliament’s Socialist Group. 61 
The Uruguay Round represented the first time that the ETUC-TCL came out with a strong 
position on the MFA. A key reason for this may well have been that the ETUC-TCL 
representatives had apparently been personally informed of the EEC’s commitment to 
liberalization in the industry and had shown only a ‘faint-hearted’ support for the social 
clause. 62  
Intriguingly – and perhaps indicative of trade union leaders’ limited outlook in this 
period - the TUC and the ETUC found a far firmer base of support (albeit indirectly) for both 
the MFA and the social clause in the form of the US government. It was during this stage of 
                                                          
59 TUC Report of Annual Congress, 1987 (London, 1987), 321. 
60 TUC Report of Annual Congress, 1988 (London, 1988), 314. 
61 TUC Report of Annual Congress, 1986 (London, 1986), 366. 
62 MRC, Warwick, TUC Archive, MSS.292D/631/9, TUC-TCFC Report: ETUC-TCL meeting with the 
Commission, 17 January 1986. 
24 
 
the Uruguay Round that the TUC’s conflation of the MFA and the social clause reached its 
peak despite its lack of support at the national and European level. Unsurprisingly, the US 
government emerged as an avenue of support for the social clause out of strategic self-interest 
rather than political conviction. This stemmed from the Reagan and Bush administrations’ 
opposition to the provision of similar social clauses in unilateral trade laws which the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) were 
pursuing at the time. 63 In the context of the time, it is hard to view this move as anything 
other than a cynical ploy to cut across AFL-CIO moves for unilateral action which held a far 
greater potential for impinging on the neo-liberal agenda that the US was carrying out in this 
period.  
From the US government’s point of view, multilateral action on labour standards 
seemed a win-win situation; it would placate the AFL-CIO to some extent and, if successful 
(which remained unlikely), limit the damage developing economies posed to US industry. As 
part of this agreement, US Trade Representatives requested that a GATT-ILO working group 
be set up to study the link between trade and workers’ rights as a step towards the inclusion 
of labour standards in the final text of the Uruguay Round. 64 The TUC-TCFC, ETUC-TCL 
and ICFTU were all able to use this turn of events to put pressure on national governments 
and European institutions for the inclusion of a social clause in the GATT. For example, a 
resolution passed at the TUC’s 1988 Annual Congress committed the union to endorsing the 
social clause in all trade and aid agreements. 65 Further, it was noted that,  
pressure for a social clause was being maintained by the proposal from the US Government that GATT 
should examine the links between trade and workers’ rights ( ... ) Following lobbying by the TUC, the 
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British Government has said it will support the US proposal, though it does not accept at this stage that it 
should lead to a social clause. It was reported at the meeting with the European Commission in June that 
the EC Commissioner for external trade policy, Mr Andriessen, had said that if there was no progress on 
the US proposal for joint examination by GATT and ILO of the links between trade and workers’ rights, 
the Commission would propose the introduction of a social clause in the Uruguay round. 66  
This political situation afforded the trade unions the opportunity to put across its 
combined position on the MFA and social clause more clearly than it had ever done before. It 
is significant that there was a united perspective on how to argue and frame these issues 
which ran through the TUC’s, ETUC’s and ICFTU’s public and private statements. In 
particular, it was understood that the framing of the social clause as an anti-protectionist 
measure held a great deal of potential in the present economic and political climate. In turn, it 
was also understood that this position could simultaneously be used as ‘a positive lever to 
achieve improvements in the conditions in exporting countries, rather than as a backdoor 
device for reducing trade’. 67 Ultimately however, despite its greater prominence over the 
course of the Uruguay Round, the social clause still remained an issue that was disconnected 
from the trade unions wider economic arguments in a similar way as had occurred during the 
Tokyo Round. The most important objective change was therefore the economic situation 
which had fundamentally changed from the TUC’s perspective and therefore resulted in a 
different strategic outlook. 
In a very short period of time, the social clause had moved from predominantly being a 
trade union issue (which was not even that actively pursued by the unions themselves) to an 
issue that was ‘supported’ (albeit indirectly and without political conviction) by the vast 
majority of the Western members of the GATT. However, viewing these events as a success 
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for the TUC and others should be seen as very relative. Firstly, although the Uruguay Round 
saw the beginning of the social clause as a key issue in future world trade negotiations, it has 
still not led to its implementation for numerous reasons, not least among them the consistent 
opposition of developing economies. Secondly (and ironically), it is debatable whether the 
issue would have gained any prominence at all were it not for the political strategy of the US 
government. Thirdly, whilst the increase in support for the social clause coincided with 
politically opportune events, this support was not based on a genuine agreement with the 
trade union understanding of the social clause or the future direction of world trade policy 
and occurred at a time where the success of trade union arguments in society generally stood 
at an all-time low.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has attempted to frame the TUC’s influence over textile policy during the Tokyo 
and Uruguay Rounds within the changing structural dynamics of the world economy which 
had a profound effect on its strategic choices. These strategic choices were argued to be 
broadly based within the ideas of embedded liberalism, which in the post-war context had 
provided the TUC with strong avenues of influence within a national corporatist framework. 
However, this article has also argued that the compromise of embedded liberalism also 
constituted a wider historic compromise between labour and capital that could not remain 
indefinitely. Unprecedented economic growth and the specific social, economic and political 
conditions of the post-war period provided the ‘space’ in which labour could draw 
concessions from capital. Once these conditions disappeared with the global economic crises 
of the 1970s then the whole basis of the TUC’s strategic perspective was also undermined.  
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Although the strength of the TUC’s relationship with the Labour Party had been 
fundamentally undermined through the onslaught of neo-liberal economic restructuring by 
the time of the Uruguay Round, this actually contributed to the TUC developing a multi-
option and multi-level strategy. These strategies were pursued at the national, European and 
transnational levels to a far greater extent than during the Tokyo Round. In particular, the 
increasing reliance on the ETUC to lobby at the Community level is a key development in the 
evolution of the TUC’s strategy. With respect to the TUC’s textile policy, the MFA can be 
viewed as a framework in which to support economic reforms that could contribute to the 
maintenance of the embedded liberal system. In this environment, the TUC attempted to 
synchronize its interests with national governments and, by extension, the EEC. Again, the 
economic shift from embedded liberalism to neo-liberalism was the key variable in 
explaining why this policy alignment occurred far more during the Tokyo Round than the 
Uruguay Round. 
It was also pointed out that the TUC’s support for the MFA and the social clause were 
rarely linked explicitly. When meeting with government ministers, there appeared to be an 
almost complete emphasis on the importance of immediate economic issues, namely the 
necessity of import quotas to offset the increasing trade imbalance between developed and 
developing economies in the textile industry. In its more public pronouncements however, the 
TUC seems to have been more willing to discuss these issues with a more long-term vision in 
mind, couched in a vague language of solidarity. Without question, whether it was at the 
national, transnational or European level, the TUC overwhelmingly prioritized aligning its 
immediate economic interests with whoever it was attempting to influence at the time. 
Despite understanding the importance of the social clause as a mechanism, however limited, 
of simultaneously protecting the UK textile industry and improving the conditions of workers 
in developing countries, the TUC always prioritized domestic self-interest over transnational 
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solidarity. Nevertheless, the notions of solidarity that are present in the concept of the social 
clause played an important role in framing the legitimacy of the issue beyond self-interested 
economics alone.    
The limits of the above strategy became ever clearer as neo-liberalism continued to 
overhaul embedded liberalism. By choosing to align their economic interests with elite actors, 
the TUC would increasingly find themselves trying to influence actors and institutions that 
were openly hostile to their role in society. Unsurprisingly, there is a direct correlation 
between the decline in socialist and social democratic governments throughout Europe and 
the level of influence the TUC and other unions were able to exert. In many ways, frozen by 
the structural and ideological onslaught against the labour movement’s core principles and 
areas of support, the TUC had become path dependent and was in need of a new approach 
and narrative by the close of the Uruguay Round, even if the same social, economic and 
political problems existed.  
The limited ambitions and strategies of the TUC during the Uruguay Round must be 
put in the context of the time which represented a period of defeats for the UK labour 
movement, most prominently the defeat of the 1984-85 Miners’ Strike. Ultimately, the 
leadership of the TUC had no clear explanation or class perspective of the series of setbacks 
seen in this period. This undoubtedly contributed to consolidating its already existing 
conservatism and dependency on attempting to synchronise its interests with elite actors. 
However, as neo-liberalism swiftly became embedded as a hegemonic ideology, the status 
afforded to previous methods of influence became a self-fulfilling prophecy, ultimately 
leading to the TUC and many other unions from the late-1980s onwards tacitly endorsing the 
same neo-liberal policies that were ultimately hostile to the interests of their members, both 
through domestic economic policies and international trade agreements. 
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One strategy that may have overcome this paralysis would have been to engage in 
active solidarity and transnational action with unions in the Global South. However, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the TUC made any attempt to support or engage with these unions 
beyond calling for the social clause in an abstract sense. In this respect, the TUC limited its 
strategy and ideological framework to maintaining the system of embedded liberalism, a 
system that, as the 1980s progressed, was rapidly unravelling. As such, the TUC’s strategic 
choices in influencing the MFA and social clause were almost entirely confined to the elite 
level, detached from the rank-and-file textile workers who would ultimately pay the price for 
the neo-liberal restructuring that would follow. Rather than proposing a programme of 
limited reforms of the GATT trading system, which was increasingly prepared to let whole 
industries, such as textiles, collapse in the face of open competition from economies with an 
absolute advantage in production costs, the TUC and the European trade union movement as 
a whole could have demanded a radical reassessment of trade policy by mobilising their 
members in defence of the textile industry, forcing governments and ultimately the GATT to 
put labour interests at the heart of global trade policy. The fact that the TUC and others did 
not follow this logic has undoubtedly contributed to their precarious position in the present 
period. 
The lack of historical research into the role of trade union influence over world trade 
negotiations is an area of study that poses great potential for future research. Such research 
could make a significant contribution to current trade union strategies and the academic 
literature. For trade unions today, such research could help explain the historical roots of their 
decline through an analysis of past decisions, potentially contributing to their reawakening. 
This could pave the way for an honest and open self-assessment of trade union influence over 
world trade, an issue which continues to grow in importance. Without doubt, ordinary union 
members should play a leading role in such a process. Academically, research of the kind 
30 
 
undertaken for this article would cut across the prevalence of realist and rational choice 
conceptions of world trade and bring in from the cold the role of social forces that are often 
ignored. A trade union perspective of the changing dynamics of world trade would give an 
entirely different view on the interactions between labour, capital and the state in certain 
historical phases. More specifically, research in this area could also provide greater insight 
into the multi-level environment that trade unions seek to influence in increasingly difficult 
circumstances.  
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